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National governments are facing unprecedented challenge for governing as globalization 
has become an eroding force to state capacity and legitimacy. Growth, economic security, ethnic 
conflict, democratization, transnational organizations, social movements, all these, among many 
other factors, contribute to the decline of state capacities. The public opinion is consequently 
moving in divergent directions, very much away from government’s wishes. This decline of 
public support, or waning of state legitimacy, in turn, is damaging the psychological and 
ideological base of state capacity of surviving these difficulties.  
The world thus has witnessed increasing instances of legitimacy crises that contribute to 
state failure. The political turbulence inflicts legitimacy crisis not only in authoritarian states and 
new democracies but also in established democracies, although to a less severe degree1. Yet, for 
transitional societies, which include both authoritarian states that are under pressure for political 
openness and new democracies that are confounded by consolidation problems, the task is much 
more difficult than in their advanced counterparts. More sophisticated measures are called for.  
In the meantime, however, the challenge also forces states to seek a variety of measures 
to reinforce their legitimacy and weather the storm of globalization. Political elites are not 
passive actors that only manage to escape. On the contrary, they are quite capable of taking 
advantage of the situation to reinforce their control. They, as Cohen argues, are fighting back, for 
good or for ill2. They retain their freedom of maneuver, and often succeed.  
The way politicians maintain their control varies depending upon the circumstances states 
face and resources politicians can employ. Yet, a common strategy is to use nationalist sentiment 
to influence public opinion so as to build up a psychological and ideological basis for legitimacy. 
The relevant literature has documented numerous cases on how nationalism is used in a variety 
of conditions. Yet, as Robinson claims, “most theories focus on nationalism’s power to transform 
societies, but its origins and mechanisms remain too complex to encompass in a single 
formulation”3  
 This study contributes to this literature by (1) offering a quantitative analysis of the 
sources of nationalism, that is, the factors that are crucial to promote nationalism; (2) applying 
the analysis into a particular context, contemporary China, which in many ways encourages 
researchers to reflect on the existing literature.  
                                                 
 Huisheng Shou is a PhD student in political science at the University of Illinois, Urbana and Champaign. His research interests 
include comparative and international political economy, comparative public opinion, and survey methods. His recent publication 
is a book chapter “Nationalism and Political Support in Reforming China,” in S. J. Guo ed. Challenges Facing Chinese Political 
Development (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.) (forthcoming in 2007) 
1 Delton, Russell, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House, 1996) and Pippa Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 
2 Cohen, Samy, The Resilience of the State: Democracy and the Challenges of Globalization (Boulder, Co: Lynne Riener 
Publisher, 2006) 
3 Robinson, Michael, “Enduring Anxieties: Cultural Nationalism and Modern East Asia” in Harumi Befu, ed. Cultural 
Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity (Berkeley: Institute of East Asia Studies: Univ of Cal 1993),170  
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Fall 2006, Vol. 1, No. 2, p133-148  133
Nationalism and State Legitimacy in Contemporary China 
 
                                                
This article is organized as follows. The first section is a discussion of the literature of 
nationalism in general. The second section discusses the relationships between nationalism and 
legitimacy. The following section presents a discussion of nationalism in China’s specific 
context. After clarifying the controversies surrounding the concept of nationalism, I present a 
quantitative analysis using the dataset from the fourth wave of the World Values Surveys (WVS) 
conducted in China in 2000. The fourth section presents data description and model specification. 
The following section presents findings and offers a discussion. In Conclusion, I discuss policy 
implications of nationalism from a comparative perspective.  
 
Nationalism: A Conceptual Clarification  
 
State legitimacy is rooted in many things. At the psychological level, loyalties cultivated 
through nationalism are crucial for legitimacy. Nationalism is a powerful tool to build and 
maintain loyalty among citizens within the state. According to Alter, this power comes from its 
ability to allocate “the source of individual identity within a ‘people,’ which is seen as the bearer 
of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.”4  
Yet, the power of nationalism is often obscured by the fact that there has been very little 
consensus on its definition and meaning. The concept of nationalism is deemed as “one of the 
most ambiguous concepts in the present-day vocabulary of political and analytical thought”5. 
The controversies surrounding the concept are so enormous that the literature has been described 
as a “terminological jungle”6. 
The concepts that are most relevant to nationalism are national identity and state 
attachment, which are often interchangeable. Fearon and Laitin define “identity” as “a social 
category…and in particular to a social category that an individual member either takes special 
pride in or views as a more-or-less unchangeable and socially consequential attribute.”7 Thus, 
national identity and state attachment refer to citizens’ loyalty to the nation, or a political 
community consisting of a group of people with a high degree of solidarity, a shared sense of 
history and culture or common language, an attachment to a particular territory, and in some 
cases desire for sovereign power over the territory.8  
Many authors distinguish the two variants of national identity: patriotism and nationalism, 
which refer to the benign and malevolent sides of national identity.9  This is what splits scholars 
on the relationship between national identity and nationalism. In the above argument, 
nationalism is the extreme form of national identity, a malevolent sentiment containing prejudice 
toward outsiders. However, from a different perspective, other scholars consider this extreme 
form as Chauvinism, rather than nationalism. For these authors, nationalism is to a large extent 
 
4 Alter, Peter, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1985), 1 
5 Ibid. 
6Akzin, Benjamin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1964) 10 
7 Fearon, James and David Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identities”, International Organization 
(Autumn, 2000) 845-877. 
8Hechter, M.,  Containing Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press 2000), 10-15  
9Elkins, Z. and J. Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States”, 2006, Unpublished Manuscript. Kosterman, R. and 
S. Feshback, “Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes” Political Psychology, 10:257-274. Schatz, R. E. Staub 
and H. Lavine, “On the Varieties of National Attachment: Bland Versus Constructive Patriotism” Political Psychology, 1999, 20 
(1), 151-174 
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equal to national identity and state attachment. Comaroff and Stern, for instance, made a 
distinction on nationalism between the “inward-directed sentiments” that hold a nation together 
and the “out-ward-directed sentiments” that heap hostility upon others.10 This is exactly how the 
previous group of authors defines national identity.  
Notice that, both concepts, national identity and nationalism, are multidimensional. 
Scholars choose one over another for specific meaning and purpose of research. But in many 
cases the two concepts converge, referring to the psychological basis of legitimacy rooted in the 
loyalty of the public to the political community. The purpose of this study is to identify the 
factors that underpin this loyalty rather than   distinguishing whether this loyalty is inward-
directed or outward-directed. For this purpose, the two concepts can be measured by the same 
indices in survey questions. The items usually include connection to countrymen, national 
belonging, and national pride. National pride is particularly common in survey design. It is also 
the index in the WVS, which is the data source the analysis this study is based on.  
 
Nationalism, Legitimacy, and Elite Discourse 
 
Nevertheless, a justification is needed on why nationalism instead of national identity is 
chosen as the subject in this study if the two concepts are similar. This brings in another concern 
of this study: the role of political elites.  
Nationalism is more often than national identity to be treated as a political tool used by 
governments and political elites to maneuver mass attitudes. That makes nationalism often 
negative because of its potential to promote irrational devotion to the nation as well as prejudice 
towards outsiders.  
From a positive perspective, scholars in framing literature on public opinion recognize 
that public opinion is often shaped by, or even originated from, elite discourse via various means, 
of which the most influential one is media11. Political elites, as defined by Zaller, are those 
“persons who devote themselves full time to some aspect of politics or public affairs…These 
elites include politicians, higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many 
kinds of experts and policy specialists”.12 The central argument of framing literature, descending 
from Schatteschneider’s classic statement,13 is that political elites define the terms of debate and 
people can do no more than choose among the offered options. Modern interpretation of this 
argument is that individuals vary in their opinions due to their exposure to political information 
and argumentation in the media. In constructing their opinion statements, people make greatest 
use of ideas that are most immediately salient to them. That is, their attitudes depend on a large 
scale upon elite discourse and communications. The key element in the underlying mechanism is 
information – elites control the information necessary for the mass to form preferences.  
                                                 
10 Comaroff, J. L. and P.C. Stern, “New Perspectives on Nationalism and War” in Comaroff and Stern, Perspectives on 
Nationalism and War  (Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach 1995) 
11Zaller, John, the Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Iyenger, S. and D.Kinder, 
News that Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Ivenger, S., Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames 
Political Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993) 
12Zaller op. cit. 6   
13Schatteschneider, E.E., The Semi Sovereign People  (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). 
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This mechanism of forming public opinions is often called framing. Druckman defines 
framing effect as the following: “A framing effect occurs when in the course of describing an 
issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes 
individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.”14  
Against this argument, however, other studies, labeled as “deliberation literature,” defend 
the ability of the public of making sense of politics and responding to elite influence in an active 
way. They argue that the public is rational in that they selectively take cues from political elites 
and fellow citizens as well. Even though most individual citizens do not make sense of politics, 
they, collectively, act and think reasonably and rationally. What this argument suggests is that 
the frames on which people form their political opinions not only come from elites but also from 
interpersonal conversations. Furthermore, the public is capable of influencing elite discourse as 
well, even though they depend on elites to provide information and cues. 15
From a comparative perspective, both sides of the above arguments are supported by 
concrete evidence. For the framing literature, the argument is echoed by the scholars that see 
“nation” as a “constructed” or “invented” concept. That is, nation is the outcome of a rational 
choice of individuals in order to achieve common interests. 16    In this process, political 
entrepreneurs play the central role in that they use the concept to mobilize the public in response 
to specific circumstances. They often take advantage of national identity to promote their 
interests, for good or for ill. On the other hand, as already recognized in the literature of 
nationalism, nationalist sentiment is both a constructive and destructive force for states because 
this very tool can be utilized by citizens to pursue political rights and freedom, for both 
individual and group interests.17  
To compromise the debate, I argue that nationalism is a rational choice for both the 
public and elites as well. They chose nationalism as a measure to sustain their belief system and 
tie themselves to the nation for the common interests. This argument seems obvious. Yet, a 
question is often ignored: Why is nationalism chosen at the first place? Can it play a universal 
role in different contexts?  
To answer these questions is beyond the scope of this study, which is merely tempted to 
identify sources of nationalism. In specific, the main purpose is to identify whether and to what 
extent nationalism is shaped by elite discourse. Yet, a tentative answer may be that the extent to 
which nationalism takes effect relies on to what extent democracy has been established and 
consolidated in the given nation. A plausible explanation is that, a nation where democracy has 
not yet internalized among citizens as the cornerstone of their belief system, nationalism is more 
likely to be used to play such a role because of its irrational side that is often effective in 
mobilizing emotion and affection.  
 
14 Druckman, James,  The Implications of Framing for Citizen Competence, Political Behavior, 23, 2001,225-256 
15 Page, B. and Shapiro, R., The Rational Public (Chicago University Press 1992). Sniderman, P., R. Brody and P. Tetlock, the 
Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Lupia A., 
M..McCubbins and S. Popkin, eds, Elements of Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of Political Rationality (New 
York” Cambridge University Press, 1999). Kuklinski J. H. ed, Citizen and Politics (New York (Cambridge University Press 2001) 
16  Anderson, B., Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
Hobsbawm, E “Introduction: Inventing Traditions and Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914” In E. Hobsbawm and T. 
Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) 
17 Greenfield, Liah, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), Tibi, Bassam, Arab 
Nationalism, A Critical Inquiry (London: McMillan, 1981). Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and 
Nationalist Conflict (New York:  Norton and Company, 2000).  
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In a dialectic manner, nationalism, particularly in transitional societies, is the outcome of 
interaction between mass nationalist sentiment and elite discourse. That is, the sources of 
nationalism are rooted in the interests of both mass and elites. Both sides call for an ideological, 
psychological, and emotional substitution to fill the vacuum of traditional ideologies such as 
communism that have died away along with market expansion and decline of political control. 
This trend exists literally everywhere, but particularly salient in those transitional societies where 
the established belief systems either are challenged or have gone but democracy has not yet 
established or consolidated so as to offer a solid basis for a new belief system.  
 
Nationalism in Contemporary China: Convergence of Elite Discourse and 
Mass Demand 
 
Although the Communist ideologies have largely waned away since the reforms in China 
have taken place in the late 1970s, nationalism did not become appealing to both the Chinese 
government and its citizens until the early 1990s.  Then the orthodox Communist ideologies, 
which in a large part subsume nationalist rhetoric into internationalist rhetoric, lost steam. The 
turning point is 1989 Tiananmen Square student protests as well as the fall of communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union during the same period, which eventually destroyed 
the influence of Communist ideologies. Early 1990s witnessed a short period of ideological and 
moral disorder for both the government and intellectuals in China. At the same time when the 
authority gave up communism as an effective tool to mobilize, liberal intellectuals also found 
themselves distant away from western liberal-democratic ideologies that they once embraced 
wholeheartedly. A pragmatic mode led both sides to seeking an alternative and both believed that 
this alternative must be something that appealed to the practical need of the masses.  
For the public, corruption and economic hardship that emerged since the late 1980s 
produced a mood of nostalgia for Mao’s regime, which, in the memory of the public, was clean, 
moral, and ordered. A cynical sense among the public towards the authority was so evident and 
widespread that it was hard to dispute that the Communist authority was, after a decade 
recovering, facing another legitimacy crisis.  
A patriotic education campaign that was launched in early 1990s marks the beginning of 
massive governmental efforts to promote nationalism to restore legitimacy.18 Zhao documented 
the campaign in great detail and found that this “state-led” nationalism successfully restored the 
respect among the public to the communist authority. Indeed, the 1990s and onward are marked 
as the period that popular nationalism –that is, nationalism embraced by the public without being 
mobilized by the government– prevails in China.19  
Moreover, intellectuals began to uphold patriotism and nationalism as well. Well-known 
“say no” sentiment – following the 1996 bestseller “China Can Say No” provoked anti-US 
sentiment— represents an extreme form of intellectual discourse shifting towards government’s 
interests.20 The trend among the whole intellectual circle, however, is fundamentally not very far 
from this position. Many who were liberalists prior to Tiananmen event have turned to 
                                                 
18Zhao, Suisheng, A Nation–State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press 2004)  
19Zhao, Ibid, 225.  
20Zheng, Yongnian, Et. Al, China That Can Say No, (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996)  
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nationalism. (Two of the four authors of the “Say No” book were actually among the students 
participating in Tiananmen protests). Observers admit that “nationalist sentiment has come to 
dominate the thousands of Chinese students and scholars, if not the whole nation”.21  
Even more noticeable is that intellectuals have become a significant force to assist the 
government in promoting nationalism. The “Say No” book, though representing an extreme 
opinion from an academic perspective, is not extreme in a popular sense. It indicates a 
convergence of elite nationalism and popular nationalism. As one of the authors of the book 
argues, “[S]ome say we have aroused popular opinion. It would be better to say that popular 
opinion aroused us”.22  
It is certainly important to notice that recent Chinese nationalist sentiment has its market 
and international origins. Rising economic standards since the mid 1990s contribute to the 
resurgence of nationalism a great deal. Meanwhile, international relations always play a big role 
in stimulating nationalism, particularly when a nation is seeking to regain international respect. 
Wealth, openness, and raising international status have introduced more frequent international 
confrontation between China and the western world.23 Along with a series of events such as 
Hong Kong and Macau returns (1997 and 1999), Belgrade Bombing protests (1999), bidding for 
hosting 2008 Olympic game (2000), the nationalist sentiment has eventually accumulated into a 
prominent force in the late 1990s.  
 
Measuring Nationalism in China 
 
The above sketch on recent nationalist sentiment in China indicates that nationalism has 
its origins in various sources, although the primary emphasis in this study is given to the 
interaction between elite discourse and mass demands for an ideological and emotional basis of 
legitimacy. Numerous studies have been devoted to understanding the issue. Yet, much of the 
literature fails to provide concrete evidence on whether these factors among many others play a 
role in shaping nationalist sentiment among the public and, more importantly, what their 
magnitudes are. The part of the reason, besides that the subject has been understudied, is the lack 
of data that allow researchers to measure. Yet, recent survey studies have provided opportunities 
for such research. This study offers such an effort using one of these datasets and provides some 
preliminary evidence.  
The WVS is one of the survey datasets that have been respected for their qualities and 
been frequently used for various studies because of the broad coverage of their questionnaire and 
the nations surveyed. There have been five waves of WVS surveys across the globe from 1985 to 
2005, for every five years (the 2005 WVS is not yet available). Its China survey began from the 
second wave in 1990. In the 1990 and 1995 surveys, the sampling was proportionately in favor 
of urban population. The fourth wave of survey conducted in 2000 began using nationwide 
 
21Gries, P.H., China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of Cal Press 2004). Liew, Leong 
and Shaoguang Wang, Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 
2004) 
22Quoted in Gries, op cit, 127  
23Chang, Maria Shia, Returned of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism (Westview Press, 2001). He, Baogang and Guo 
Yingjie, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (Brookfield: Ash Gate, 2000. Zhang, Yunling, China-US-
Japan Relations in Transition, (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1997). Zheng, Yongman, Discover Chinese Nationalism in 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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random sampling. Thus the dataset from 2000 survey can be considered as one of the most 
important ones conducted in China by private survey institutions. The only another globe-wide 
survey with similar scope is the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2002. But its sampling only 
covers a few major cities. Therefore I use the WVS 2000 dataset in this study.  
To uncover the nature of nationalism in contemporary China, the empirical task is (1) to 
identify meaningful measures of nationalism, (2) to identify the key variables that determine 
nationalism, and (3) to estimate their effects on nationalism with appropriate models.   
  
Dependent Variable  
In WVS, there are two questions that can be used to measure nationalism. One is self-
categorization as a member of the state. In the question, respondents were asked “How proud are 
you to be Chinese?” Another question that is often used by scholars (e.g. Norris, 1999; 
Klingemann, 1999) as a measure of national identity asks respondents about willingness to 
volunteer for military service: “Of course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it 
were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (1) Yes, (2) No.”  
The second question would be a good indicator of the malevolent nature of nationalism. 
Yet, according to Chinese respondents in 2000 overwhelmingly gave a positive answer to this 
question. There were only 3.1 % among 1000 respondents giving negative answers, compared to 
89.9% of positive answers. This makes this variable meaningless in an analysis. Thus I will only 
use the first question as the measure of nationalism.  
 
Explanatory Variables  
 I use a battery of variables to uncover the causes of nationalism in contemporary China. 
These include economic, social, demographic aspects. Statistical description of all the variables 
including the dependent variable is presented in Table 1. I also present missing values for all the 
variables following their observation number, given the fact that a large portion of missing value 
may seriously affect estimation. Fortunately, all the variables I choose except “ownership” and 
“competition” have missing values more than 10 percent (13.7 and 13.1). Since the acceptable 
percentage of missing values usually is 15 percent, these are quite pleasant figures (see Table 1).   
Political exposure  
As discussed in the previous section, the main focus in this study is on the interaction 
between elite discourse and mass demands for nationalism. Cultivating national identity is not a 
self-fulfilling process by individuals themselves. Rather, it is often the result of interaction 
between political elites and individuals. The primary mediator that sustains this interaction is the 
media. As one is exposed to the media, his or her attitudes are likely to be affected by the 
discourse of elites and the government. A question in WVS that measures the extent to which 
individuals are exposed to political influence asks “How often do you follow political news?” I 
predict that an individual that is exposed to political news is more likely than others to have 
stronger nationalist sentiment.  
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            Table 1 Data Description (Data Source: the World Values Survey 2000)  
Variables Obs (% of missing value) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Nationalist Sentiment 952 (4.8) 3.037    .752 1 4 
      
Income Level 954 (4.6) 1.852 0.786 1 3 
Economic security 993 (0.7) 5.647 2.658 1 10 
      
Social status 935 (6.5) 2.430 2.867 1 5 
      
Income gaps 909 (9.1) 6.263 3.111 1 10 
Ownership 863 (13.7) 4.214 2.867 1 10 
Responsibility 904 (9.6) 5.165 3.220 1 10 
Competition 869 (13.1) 2.720 2.186 1 10 
    1  
Educational level 1,000 (0) 3.471 1.772 1 8 
Age 1,000 (0) 3.063 1.161 1 6 
Sex (male =1) 1,000 (0) 0.494 0.500 0 1 
      
Peasant 900 (10.0) 0.622 0.485 0 1 
      
Political Exposure 959 3.781 1.349 1 5 
      
Geographic attachment 924 (7.6) 2.530 1.009 1 5 
Total sample N = 1,000 
 
Economic Growth  
There are many other variables besides political exposure that may also affect 
individuals’ nationalist attitudes. Those variables are also necessary to be controlled in order to 
truly uncover the magnitudes of the impact of nationalism. For example, it is very natural to 
assume that national pride can be promoted by the increasing level of wealth a country achieves. 
As becoming richer, one may cultivate more attachment to the nation. Yet, at the same time, the 
opposite argument may also be true – in an authoritarian regime, increasing level of wealth may 
educate individuals to become independent from the regime. Because of the close link between 
national identity and political support for the regime, the potential eroding effect of wealth to 
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national identity also presents a threat to regime survival.24 Both hypotheses will be tested in the 
models constructed in this study. 
Another economic variable is economic security individuals perceive from the rapid and 
turbulent transition. Individuals at the similar income level may have quite different perception 
about how well the economy has been going because of the different circumstances they live in. 
Together with income level, economic security helps to measure economic effect from both 
subjective and objective aspects. To measure respondents’ perception of their economic situation, 
I use a question that asks “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?”  
Perceived Social Status  
Social status often is associated with the sense of nationalist sentiment. In the literature of 
social dominance theory, it is argued that higher-status groups feel a greater sense of 
“ownership” of the national identity.25 Although the main purpose of social dominance theory is 
to explain prejudice, it is relevant here to connect social status to national pride.  
In the WVS, respondents are asked to describe themselves as one of five classes – upper 
class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, and lower class.  
Economic Ideologies 
When individuals hold certain ideologies with regard to how societies should be 
organized and how governments should manage markets, they may have a different level of 
attachment to the state. Dissatisfaction with the way the society is organized may diminish one’s 
attachment to the nation. I use four questions asked in the WVS to measure economic ideology. 
From different aspects, these questions measure whether respondents are pro-market or are prone 
to traditional socialist ideologies. 
The first question asks about income gaps – whether incomes should be made more equal 
or whether the society needs larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.  
Second one is on ownership – whether private ownership or government ownership of 
business and industry should be increased.   
In the third question, respondents are asked whether respondents believe that it is the 
government or it is people themselves that should take responsibility for their well-being.  
The last question is about competition – whether competition is good to stimulate people 
to work hard or it is harmful to their lives.  
Educational level  
How does education affect individual’s national identity? Is a higher level of education 
conducive to higher level of nationalist sentiment because of the knowledge and consciousness 
of being a member of the nation? Yet, the same knowledge may also educate one to be sober on 
their relationship to the nation. Those with lower educational level may blindly follow their 
emotion. This may be more the case in an authoritarian regime that is undergoing market reform. 
The model will test both hypotheses.   
                                                 
24Shou, Huisheng, Nationalism and Political Support in Reforming China: In S. J. Guo ed, Challenges Facing Chinese Political 
Development (Rowman and Littlefield Publish, forthcoming)  
25Figueiredo, Rui and Zachary Elkins: “Are Patriots Bigots? Inquiry into the Views of In-group Pride”, American Journal of 
Political Science, 47:1 (Jan 2003) 171-188  
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Gender 
Being a male or a female may have different effects on one’s national identity. Yet, 
whether a male is more likely than a female to have stronger nationalist sentiment, or the other 
way around, is subject to empirical test.  
Age 
Age often affects an individual’s attitudes. As individuals grow older, their nationalist 
attachment may grow as well.  
Geographic Attachment 
It is easily assumed that today’s globalization presents a powerful threat to a nation’s 
control over its citizens. Individuals may find themselves less attached emotionally to their 
nations and local communities as they are exposed to the world. Thus individuals’ nationalist 
sentiment may be affected by their perception of their community and regional attachments. That 
is, geographical identity has an impact on how individuals perceive their relationship to the 
nation. I focus on answers to the question “To which of these geographical groups would you say 
you belong first of all? (1) Locality or town where you live? (2) State or region of country where 
you live? (3) The country as a whole? (4) The continent where you live? (5) The world as a 
whole?”  
Peasant  
The last variable that may have an impact on one’s national identity is whether 
respondents are urban or rural residents. This is particularly pertinent to China’s situation where 
the urban and rural gap has tremendous influence on many issues including mass opinions. It is 
subject to empirical test, however, to say whether being a peasant makes one more conservative 
and more likely to hold strong nationalist sentiment and of what magnitude. In the WVS question 
on occupation, there are thirteen categories. The category “agricultural worker” explicitly refers 
to “peasant” in the Chinese questionnaire. None of the others would be perceived to be closely 
related to peasant in China. Therefore I created a dummy variable with 1 for peasant and 0 
otherwise.  
  
Findings and Discussion 
 
To estimate the effects of those variables on individuals’ nationalist sentiment, I construct 
six models. The first model is a full model which includes all the variables considered. It serves 
as a baseline upon which the later models will be constructed and compared. The results are 
presented in Table 2.  
 
Political Exposure 
The results presented in Table 2 highlight several variables that are important across all 
models. First is political exposure, which is highly significant as indicated by its z score which is 
the largest across all models, suggesting that political exposure is the most relevant variable to 
explain nationalist sentiment. Its coefficient is only occasionally smaller than others but only in a 
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slight degree, suggesting that a significant proportion of variation in the dependent variable can 
be accounted for by political exposure. 
 
      Table 2 Logit Estimates of Nationalist Sentiment in China (World Values Survey, 2000) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Income Level  0.251* 
(.120) 
0.325**
(.115) 
0.273* 
(.119) 
0.133 
(0.105) 
0.167 
(0.103) 
  
        
Economic Security  0.006 
(.033) 
0.0236 
(.031) 
0.010 
(.033) 
0.019 
(0.031) 
0.023 
(0.031) 
0.021 
(0.032) 
0.045 
(0.029) 
        
Social Status 0.249* 
(.108)  
0.272* 
(.107) 
0.257* 
(0.101) 
0.273** 
(0.101) 
0.286** 
(0.105) 
 
        
Income Gaps -0.056* 
(.026) 
-0.061*
(.025) 
-0.055*
(.026) 
-0.056*
(0.245) 
-0.057* 
(0.024) 
-0.054* 
(0.026) 
-0.061* 
(0.025) 
        
Ownership 0.005 
(.029) 
0.000**
(.029) 
-0.000 
(0.029) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.005 
(0.028) 
        
Responsibility -0.069** 
(.025) 
-0.082 
(.024) 
-0.072**
(0.025) 
-0.067**
(0.024) 
-0.070**
(0.024) 
-0.073** 
(0.025) 
-0.089***
(0.024) 
        
Competition -0.052 
(.037) 
-0.063 
(.036) 
-0.043 
(0.037) 
-0.030 
(0.035) 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
-0.049 
(0.036) 
-0.057 
(0.035) 
        
Educational Level 0.034 
(.055) 
0.051 
(.054) 
0.054 
(0.054) 
0.013 
(0.049) 
0.039 
(0.048) 
0.049 
(0.054) 
0.072 
(0.053) 
        
Age -0.072 
(.073) 
-.069 
(.072) 
-0.050 
(0.072) 
-0.027 
(0.068) 
-0.006 
(0.068) 
-0.061 
(0.071) 
-0.057 
(0.070) 
        
Sex (male =1) -0.096 
(.162) 
-.123 
(.159) 
-0.022 
(0.160) 
-0.161 
(0.153) 
-0.086 
(0.151) 
-0.153 
(0.160) 
-0.198 
(0.156) 
        
Political Exposure 0.222** 
(.069) 
-.250***
(.067) 
 0.215**
(0.064) 
 0.222** 
(0.068) 
0.258*** 
(0.066) 
        
Geographic 
Attachment 
0.018 
(.080) 
.024 
(.079) 
0.033 
(0.079) 
-0.008 
(0.075) 
0.012 
(0.075) 
0.037 
(0.079) 
0.046 
(0.077) 
        
Peasant 0.408* 
(.196) 
.506** 
(.192) 
0.334 
(0.192) 
  0.238 
(0.179) 
0.295 
(0.176) 
LR chi2 49.27 51.15 39.78 49.27 38.89 45.61 45.72 
        
log like -661.43 -681.27 -669.92 -735.11 -744.67 -675.01 -702.87 
        
Pseudo R 2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
        
N (obs.) 642 656 646 703 708 656 675 
       Note: standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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A conclusion that can be drawn from this simple glance is that the findings confirm my 
main hypothesis: political exposure significantly influences individuals’ formation of nationalist 
sentiment. Although this is not sufficient to confirm the argument of the framing literature that 
elite discourse determines the public’s attitudes – we lack the variable to measure to what extent 
the interpersonal conversation contributes to the formation of nationalist sentiment – it does 
show that the public’s opinions are strongly affected by their degree of political exposure. This 
argument is further supported by the fact that we control the impacts of a battery of variables 
such as income level, social status, ideologies, educational level, and demographic variables.  
 
Social Status 
We have to admit, however, political exposure is not the only variable that determines the 
nationalist sentiment among the public. Social status, for example, exerts an almost equally 
strong impact. The higher the social status one perceives to belong to, the more likely the person 
holds stronger nationalist sentiments. This confirms the very argument made by social 
dominance theory we previously discussed that higher-status groups feel a greater sense of 
“ownership” of the national identity. 
 
Economic ideologies 
Pro-market economic ideologies are not as straightforward a predictor as political 
exposure and social status. Among four indicators of economic ideologies, ownership and 
competition are not significant at all in any models. But the other two are significant in all 
models. Responsibility is particularly salient, right next to political exposure for both its z value 
and coefficient.  
That ownership is not significant is understandable in China’s context in that property 
rights are never as clearly defined as it is in western societies. The two decades of reform seldom 
focus upon cultivating private property rights as the main goal on its agenda. For the public, only 
a small portion of the populace that is heavily concentrated in urban areas, may hold strong sense 
of private property rights. Among the rest of the populace, majority of the urban residents still 
have a variety of connections to the public sector. Rural residents are still influenced by the sense 
of community because of the slow pace of suburbanization and heavy reliance upon the public 
assets of the village and township community in most areas. If anything, the public may hope the 
government to sustain the public ownership in the course of market reform. This would connect 
the public ownership with nationalist sentiment in a positive way. The positive sign of the 
variable in most models confirms this assumption, although the low correlation does not permit 
any firm conclusion.   
In contrast, three other variables, income gap, responsibility, and competition, have 
negative signs, suggesting that pro-market ideologies are likely to decrease individuals’ 
nationalist sentiment. Yet, this conclusion is not warranted if we look closer at these three 
variables. Income gap and government responsibility are not representative of pro-market 
ideologies in China’s context because of their very unique meanings in the country. An 
egalitarian society in which the government takes responsibility for one’s wellbeing traditionally 
has its legitimate position among Chinese, especially with the socialist influence remaining. The 
market reforms have not yet fundamentally changed this perception. Thus it is predictable that 
those who believe that income gap should be small and government should take responsibility 
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will hold strong nationalist sentiment, because they would believe that the nation is going in the 
right way and social justice has been maintained during the process of market reform. In contrast, 
competition is a more accurate indicator of pro-market ideologies because it does not have a 
close relationship with social justice and therefore lacks the support in traditional China. If there 
is any relationship between pro-market ideologies and nationalist sentiment, competition should 
be such an indicator in the first place. Yet, though the sign of the variable is correct, statistically 
there is no significant correlation between competition and nationalist sentiment. Thus the result 
rejects the claim that pro-market ideologies diminish nationalist sentiment.   
The correlation between pro-market ideologies and decline of nationalist sentiment 
appeared in the table, hence, is superficial and misleading in that it fails to take China’s specific 
social context into account. We can only conclude that there is no such relationship statistically 
and substantively. Yet, this does not suggest that economic ideologies are trivial. Rather, the 
findings suggest that they still matter but in a different way: it is egalitarian values embedded in 
socialist ideologies that have strong and positive impact on Chinese citizens’ perception of 
nationalism. Where the values on social justice and government responsibility are strong, 
individuals are more likely to hold nationalist attachment.  
 
Economic Growth and Peasant 
Income level and perceived economic security measure the impact of economic growth 
from both objective and subjective aspects. The findings suggest that perceived economic 
security has no substantial impact at all in any of the models. Income level, on the other hand, 
varies depending upon specific models.  
In order to uncover the nature of income level and nationalist sentiment under the 
influence of other variables, I construct the following models in which some variables that are 
significant in the full model (Model 1) are excluded. These models also serve to further test the 
influence of other variables such as political exposure, social status, economic ideologies, and 
peasant status. 
After I exclude variables of economic ideologies, either by excluding any one of them or 
four of them together, none of the other variables has significantly been changed. I did not report 
the results in order to save space. 
I suspect that income level is associated with social status, and thus is affected by the 
latter. In model 2, in which social status is excluded with other variables unchanged, the z score 
of income level increases by 0.71, and coefficient increases by 0.074. This might not be a huge 
change, but the higher z score does deserve one more star to indicate a higher level of 
significance.  
Political exposure may also influence income level since it is such a strong regressor that 
may take too much effect away from other variables. If we exclude this variable, we may see 
some increase of impact from other variables. In Model 3, I exclude political exposure and find 
no substantial change on income level and most of the other variables as well, except that 
peasant becomes only marginally significant from being significant before. 
What about peasant? In Model 4 where peasant is excluded, income level then suddenly 
becomes insignificant at all with z score merely 1.28, a substantial drop. To further confirm this 
result, I exclude peasant and political exposure as well in Model 5 on the speculation that 
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political exposure may have an impact on the relationship, although there is no theoretical 
ground for this assumption. The result, however, does not change much the z score of income 
level. Again, I construct Model 6, in which I exclude income level, to test whether the 
association between income level and being a peasant in affecting one’s nationalist sentiment 
still holds. The finding confirms the relationship: when income level is excluded, peasant 
becomes non-significant as well, with z score dropping substantially from 2.09 to 1.33. Thus the 
results give such a conclusion: income level is mainly associated with being a peasant, and also 
with social status to a lesser degree, in affecting one’s nationalist sentiment.  
What other variables affect peasant? In model 2 mentioned above, social status not only 
changes income level and drives its significance level up, but also increases the significance 
level of a peasant, with its z score increasing from 2.09 to 2.64, not a trivial increase. Model 7 
further confirms this result when both income level and social status are dropped. Peasant then 
becomes not significant. Furthermore, the result in Model 2 not only shows the impact of social 
status on peasant, but also shows that income level and being a peasant are associated in 
affecting the nationalist sentiment, since the two variables are simultaneously affected by 
increasing their significance level after dropping social status. 
These findings appear very challenging for proper interpretation. Income level and being 
a peasant may affect one’s nationalist sentiment but the relationships are ambiguous, subject to 
the impact of social status, or potentially other latent variables not detected in these models. Why 
do income level and being a peasant go together to have an impact on nationalist sentiment? Do 
they necessarily depend upon each other in explaining nationalist sentiment? Further more, why 
does social status have an impact on the relationship between both income level and being 
peasant and nationalist sentiment? What mechanisms underpin the relationships among the three 
variables? The result of a bivariate correlation test among the three variables is presented below. 
It shows that income level is correlated with both being a peasant and social status at a moderate 
level (correlation coefficients are -.439 and .303 respectively). But being a peasant is not 
correlated with social status at all (-.01).  The bivariate correlation test for each of them 
respectively with dependent variable also yields moderate correlation. It is possible that these 
variables are interacting, so one variable’s impact cannot fully be detected without another one. I 
plug the interactions among income level, being a peasant, and social status in each model, 
finding no substantial change in any of the models (results not reported). All these suggest that 
these relationships are not straightforward and will be prudent in giving any final conclusion but 
instead leave it to further studies.  
 
                 Table 3 Bivariate Correlations of Income Level, Peasant, and Social Status 
 peasant income  social status national pride 
peasant 1    
income -.439(**) 1   
social status -.010 .303(**) 1  
national pride -.028 .147(**) .162(**) 1 
N 858 912 900 952 
                      Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Educational level and other Demographic Variables  
Educational level, along with age, gender, and geographic attachment are far from 
significant, with z score seldom larger than 1, indicating that these variables play no role in 
determining nationalist sentiment. I interact education level and other variables that are 
important in Model 1, but the results do not give any substantial change (results are not reported 
here). However, we still can look at the relationships from their signs, though they are not 
significant at all. For education and geographic attachment, the signs are positive, meaning that 
increasing level of education or geographical attachment yields stronger nationalist sentiment.  
On the other hand, age and being male are negatively related to nationalist sentiment, a 
surprising finding in contrast to the assumption made previously that being a male and being 
older should positively contribute to nationalist sentiment. The dataset used in this study is 
unable to provide further information to explain this counterfactual. Further studies are needed.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The findings presented in this study help to identify the major factors determining 
nationalist sentiment among Chinese citizens. To recapitulate the findings, the most important 
factors are political exposure, social status, and socialist economic ideologies – the more an 
individual is subject to political influence through the media, the more likely this person holds a 
strong nationalist sentiment; a higher social status contributes to this sentiment as well; a 
government that emphasizes social justice and responsibility is more likely to elicit nationalist 
sentiment. Whether nationalist sentiment depends on income level may matter in particular for 
rural residents, but the relationship is not quite straightforward. Other variables, such as 
educational level, age, gender, and geographic attachment have no significant contribution to 
nationalist sentiment.  
A lesson drawn from this study is that the studies on transitional societies must be 
context-specific. All the findings and interpretations in this study must be firmly placed in the 
specific context of contemporary China. To further constrain the condition, we should say that 
they are valid only for the period of the late 1990s when China had undergone substantial 
economic and political changes and yet many relevant changes still had not yet occurred. Thus 
the conclusions drawn from this study need to be taken in a careful manner for generalization. 
Some of them may be universally applicable to other societies but others may not. For example, 
political exposure has been a commonly used strategy for governments in transitional societies to 
elicit public support and maintain legitimacy. The strategy has been proven effective, even 
though consequences in the long run are far from straightforward.  
Similarly, social status is also meaningful for legitimacy in most contexts. Its policy 
implication is that authorities should rely more upon those people who consider themselves as 
being among the high-status group. This suggests that social stratification, which is not 
necessarily associated with income level, should be treated seriously in policy making.  
Social justice and government responsibility may be more relevant to the post-communist 
societies because citizens in these countries are, at least in present time, more likely to rely on 
their socialist experiences to form their nationalist attachment and other political attitudes as well. 
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However, in those countries with no socialist traditions or experiences, these values should still 
matter, though probably in different ways.  
Finally, income level and being a peasant have ambiguous impact in this study where the 
two variables take effect only when they go together. Therefore it is difficult to assert whether 
increasing income can be considered a usual strategy for legitimacy. Yet, without taking the 
effects into a comparative perspective, no conclusion can be drawn on whether or not they are 
universally applicable.  
In brief, this study sheds new lights on the sources of nationalism, which are essential for 
the government to elicit political support from citizens. Another study this author conducted 
confirms this relationship by showing that nationalist sentiment is the most critical factor 
determining individuals’ political support at different levels such as regime, political institutions, 
and incumbent officials. 26  The findings and the conclusions in this study, though targeting 
China’s specific case, are meant to provide a preliminary effort for the further studies in a cross-
national perspective that allows researchers to take into account the variation of specific contexts 
of nations to make generalizable conclusion. 
 
 
 
26Shou, op cit.  
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